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Wrongful Life: New Cause of
Action Recognized Based Upon
Medical Malpractice Theory
Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337 (1982).
I. INTRODUCTION
While numerous courts, have recognized the right of parents to
maintain a cause of action for wrongful birth2 grounded in medical
1. E.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (failure to diagnose
pregnant mother's rubella and to inform her of the possible dangers to the
fetus); Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (failure to diagnose
cystic fibrosis in first born child in time to prevent second pregnancy or to
timely abort); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (failure to inform
mother of availability of amniocentesis procedure which could determine
that child, if born, would suffer from Down's Syndrome so that fetus could be
aborted); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978) (failure to advise of the availability of amniocentesis to determine
whether fetus would be born with Down's Syndrome); Speck v. Finegold, 497
Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (negligent performance of vasectomy and abortion
procedures resulting in birth of child with genetic disease, neurofibro-
matosis); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (failure to diagnose
pregnant mother's rubella and advise of the attendant risk to the fetus);
Dumer v. Saint Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (failure
to diagnose pregnant mother's rubella and advise of the attendant risk to the
fetus)..
2. "Wrongful birth" actions are those brought by the parents of children against
physicians or other health care providers for the negligent failure to inform
the parent, prior to conception or birth of the child, of the likelihood that the
child would be conceived or born with genetic defects so that the conception
could have been avoided or the pregnancy terminated. "Wrongful life" ac-
tions are brought by the child's parents or by a guardian ad litem on the
child's behalf and are based upon the same negligence as the parents' cause
of action for "wrongful birth." Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for
"Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth", 14 FAM. L.Q. 15 (1980); Note, On Deter-
mining Liability for "Wrongful Life'". Curlender v. Bio-Science Laborato-
ries--A Step in the Right Direction?, 17 NEw ENG. L REv. 213, 213 n.1 (1981).
Historically a great deal of confusion has existed regarding the use of the
terms, "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life," because of the wide range of fac-
tual situations which have been characterized as wrongful life actions. One
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malpractice, the same courts have steadily refused to recognize a
child's right to maintain a parallel cause of action for wrongful
life.3 Recently, in Turpin v. Sortini,4 the California Supreme Court
became the first high court of any state to recognize a child's right
to maintain a wrongful life action based on medical malpractice.
5
The action is brought by either the parents or a guardian ad litem
on behalf of the child against a physician or other health care pro-
vider for negligently failing to inform the child's parents of the pos-
sibility of conceiving or bearing a child afflicted with a genetic
defect,6 thus preventing them from avoiding the pregnancy
commentator has suggested that the term "wrongful life" has become so
unintelligible that it should be discarded and replaced with the term "genetic
malpractice." Note, A Preference for Non-existence: Wrongful Life and a Pro-
posed Tort of Genetic Malpractice, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 491 (1982). Another
commentator has approached the terminology problem by creating four cate-
gories which encompass the various distinctive factual situations that have at
one time or another been considered to be "wrongful life" actions. The first of
these, "wrongful pregnancy," consists of those cases where the parents of a
healthy child bring suit against a physician for the birth of an unwanted child
due to negligent sterilization or abortion. The second, "wrongful birth," con-
sists of those cases where parents bring an action against a physician or other
health care provider for negligently failing to inform them of the risk of birth
defects to a potential child in time to avoid conception or to terminate the
pregnancy. The third, "dissatisfied life," consists of cases brought by a child
against a parent or the state for negligently allowing the status of illegitimacy
to be conferred upon him or her. The fourth, "wrongful life," consists of those
actions brought by a child against a physician or other health care provider
for negligently failing to inform his or her parents of the likelihood that he or
she would be conceived or born with a genetic defect so that the conception
could have been avoided or the pregnancy terminated. Comment, "Wrongful
Life". The Right Not To Be Born, 54 TuL. L REv. 480, 483-87 (1980).
For another approach to classification of cases brought under the "wrong-
ful life" theory and the current status of the law regarding each classification,
see Note, Torts-Wrongful Life-Infant's Right to Sue for Negligent Genetic
Counseling, 48 TENN. L REv. 493, 496-97 (1981). See also Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d
15 (1978).
3. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Speck v. Feingold, 497 Pa.
77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); Dumer v. Saint Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233
N.W.2d 372 (1975).
4. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
5. In Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified sub nom.
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978), the
New York Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision recognizing a
child's cause of action for wrongful life, but on appeal the New York Court of
Appeals held that no cause of action had been stated. Accord, Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
6. Preconception genetic counseling and testing and postconception testing are
now available to determine potential and actual genetic irregularities in a
couple's offspring. Factors indicative of potential fetal risks include advanced
maternal age; previously afflicted children or a family history of genetic dis-
ease; racial background, e.g., Tay-Sachs disease and sickle cell anemia; expo-
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through birth control or sterilization, or, in a case where the negli-
gence follows conception, avoiding the birth through abortion. Al-
though the Turpin court recognized the wrongful life action and
availability of special damages for the extraordinary expenses nec-
essary to treat the child's hereditary ailment, the court specifically
rejected any recovery of general damages, including damages for
physical and mental pain and suffering.
7
This four-to-two decision resolved a conflict between the second
and fifth districts of the California Court of Appeal. The second
district decision in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,8 had
recognized a child's cause of action for wrongful life based upon
medical malpractice,9 but in Turpin v. Sortini,o the fifth district
sure to certain hormones, e.g., diethystilboestrol (DES), chemicals, e.g.,
thalidomide, and radiation; maternal infections during pregnancy; and a his-
tory of three or more miscarriages. A number of tests exist which can be
carried out prior to conception to determine an actual risk to a potential child
and, after conception, amniocentesis and ultrasonography can be used to di-
agnose genetic irregularities in a fetus. Rogers, Wrongful Life And Wrongful
Birth. Medical Malpractice In Genetic Counseling And Prenatal Testing, 33
S. CAL. L. REv. 713, 732-33 (1982).
In the United States almost 20,000 infants are born each year with genetic
abnormalities and almost all can be diagnosed early enough in pregnancy to
allow parents to make a decision as to whether or not to terminate the preg-
nancy. More than 60 genetic disorders can be diagnosed through amni-
ocentesis, and other defects including neural tube defects, anencephaly,
dwarfism, and malformations of internal organs can be detected by the use of
ultrasound or a combination of ultrasound and computerized axial tomogra-
phy (CAT) scanning. Note, A Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life
and a Proposed Tort of Genetic Malpractice, supra note 2, at 483 nn. 36-38.
See also Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counselling, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 618
(1979); Shaw, Genetically Defective Children: Emerging Legal Considera-
tions, 3 A. J.L. & MED. 333, 334-36 (1977); Trotzig, supra note 2, at 23-30; Note,
Father and Mother Know Best Defining the Liability of Physiciansfor Inade-
quate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1490-96 (1978).
7. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 236-39, 643 P.2d at 964-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347-49.
8. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). Hearing was denied by the
California Supreme Court in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, No. 2
Civ. 58192 Div. 1 (Cal. Sept. 4, 1980).
9. The California Court of Appeal decision in Curlender provoked considerable
comment in legal periodicals. E.g., Rogers, supra note 6, at 727-29; Note, Lia-
bility of Health Care Providers-Wrongful Life-Laboratory Tests-
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 7 AM. J.L & MED. 42 (1981); Note,
Wrongful Life-Impaired Infant's Cause of Action Recognized: Curlender v.
Rio-Science Laboratories, 1980 B.Y.U.L. REv. 676; Note, Wrongful Life, 19 J.
FAM. L. 363 (1980-81); Note, On Determining Liability for "Wrongful Life"
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories-A Step in the Right Directionl supra
note 2; Note, A Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and A Proposed
Tort of Genetic Malpractice, supra note 2, at 477; Note, Torts-Wrongful Life-
Infant's Right to Sue for Negligent Genetic Counseling, supra note 2; Note,
Torts: A Cause of Action for Wrongful Life, 20 WAsHBuRN L.J. 688 (1981).
10. 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1981).
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rejected the Curlender court's rationale. The California Supreme
Court concluded that the court of appeal decision in Turpin should
be vacated and that the trial court's dismissal should be reversed
and the case remanded for further action." However, the high
court refused to adopt fully the rationale of the Curlender court
regarding the recognition of a wrongful life action12 or regarding
the kinds of damages that should be awarded.13
In resolving the conflict between the lower courts, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court constructed a theory of wrongful life that was
based upon medical malpractice,14 drawing upon traditional theo-
ries of tort liability, current commentary of legal scholars concern-
ing wrongful life actions, and recent decisions having a bearing
upon the case. This Note analyzes Turpin in light of the traditional
tort elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages. Considera-
tion shall also be given to current policy arguments both support-
ing and opposing recognition of a cause of action for wrongful life.
It will be shown in light of these considerations that the court
properly found that a cause of action should lie for wrongful life
based upon medical malpractice and that monetary damages are
an appropriate remedy for a plaintiff-child. It will be further
shown, however, that the court did not decide correctly in refusing
to allow general damages to a plaintiff-child for being born im-
paired as opposed to not being born at all and in limiting the dam-
ages recoverable to extraordinary expenses necessary to
treatment of the hereditary ailment.
II. THE FACTS
On September 24, 1976, Hope Turpin, at the time the only child
of James and Donna Turpin, upon recommendation of her pediatri-
cian was taken to the Leon S. Peters Rehabilitation Center at the
Fresno Community Hospital to undergo an evaluation of a possible
hearing defect.l5 Dr. Adam J. Sortini, a licensed specialist in the
diagnosis and treatment of hearing and speech defects, and other
persons at the hospital examined, tested, and evaluated Hope's
hearing, subsequently informing her pediatrician that her hearing
was within normal limits.16
Slightly more than a year later, on October 15, 1977, the Turpins
learned, following a second examination and diagnoses under-
taken by other hearing specialists, that Hope had been totally deaf
11. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
12. Id. at 231, 643 P.2d at 960-61, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343-44.
13. Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
14. Id. at 229-30, 643 P.2d at 959-60, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43.
15. Id. at 223, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
16. Id.
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from the time of birth as the result of an hereditary ailment. 7
Prior to this second evaluation of Hope's hearing and to their
learning of the probabililty that any of their offspring would inherit
the same hearing defect, the Turpins conceived a second child in
December 1976.18 Joy Turpin was born on August 23, 1977, and suf-
fers from the same hereditary deafness as Hope.19 It was averred
in the Turpin's complaint that Joy would not have been conceived
had they known of Hope's hereditary deafness prior to the time
Joy was conceived.
20
A complaint joining four causes of action brought by James,
Donna, Hope, and Joy Turpin was filed against Sortini, the rehabil-
itation center, the hospital, and "various Does."21 Of the four
causes of action, only the second cause, brought on behalf of Joy,
was before the California Supreme Court on appeal. This cause of
action sought
(1) general damages for being "deprived of the fundamental right of a
child to be born a whole functional human being without total deafness"
and (2) special damages for the "extraordinary expenses for specialized
teaching, training and hearing equipment" which she will incur during her
lifetime as a result of her hearing impairment.2 2
The defendants demurred to Joy's complaint and "after briefing
and argument the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave
to amend."2 3 Subsequently, the California Court of Appeal di-
rected the entry of a judgment dismissing Joy's cause of action in
the trial court so that the appellate court could consider the issue
of whether or not Joy's allegations stated a cause of action. 24
M. COURT OF APPEAL DECISION
The California Court of Appeal, Fifth District, characterized Joy
Turpin's complaint as a wrongful life action in which it was alleged
17. Id. at 224, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
18. Id..
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. The first cause of action was brought on behalf of Hope to recover for
harm resulting from the delay in proper diagnosis of her condition. The third
and fourth causes of action sought, respectively, special damages on behalf of
James and Donna for the support and medical needs of Joy to the age of ma-
jority, and general damages for emotional distress resulting from rearing and
caring for a child who is totally deaf.
23. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 224, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
24. Turpin v. Sortini, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690,-, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128, 129 n.1 (1981). The
record of the trial court contained no entry of a judgment of dismissal and the
order sustaining the demurrer was nonappealable. Therefore, the trial court
was ordered to enter a judgment of dismissal so the appeal could be treated
as if it came from the judgment.
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that the defendants' negligence in failing to properly diagnose the
hereditary deafness of her elder sister, Hope, resulted in Joy's be-
ing "'deprived of the fundamental right of a child to be born as a
whole functional human being without total deafness .. '. ,"25
The sole issue considered by the court was whether Joy's allega-
tions stated a cause of action.26 By a two-to-one majority, the court
held that an impaired, but living, child has no cause of action for
the injury of birth.27
In determining that no cause of action had been stated, the
court of appeal rejected the prior decision of the California Court
of Appeal, Second District, in Curlender.28 In that case, a cause of
action for wrongful life was recognized based upon the negligent
failure to inform prospective parents of facts needed by them to
make a conscious choice not to become parents.29 In addition, the
Curlender court found that such a child is entitled to recover dam-
ages for the pain and suffering which result from the impaired con-
dition and any special pecuniary loss, including special medical
care costs not recovered by the parents in their separate wrongful
birth action.
30
In Turpin, the court of appeal refused to follow the Curlender
decision in recognizing a wrongful life action and in allowing dam-
ages because: (1) the criteria for changing a longstanding rule of
law had not been met;31 (2) the weight of authority was totally
against allowing recovery;32 (3) the damages alleged were not cog-
nizable at law because they could not be measured;33 (4) recogni-
tion of the cause of action would be contrary to public policy which
places a special premium upon human life;34 (5) recognition would
spawn litigation opening up new areas of claims the nature and
extent of which could not be predicted;35 (6) it would be inconsis-
tent to hold an illegitimate birth did not result in injury, but a
physically impaired birth did;36 (7) recognition could interfere
with the right of parents to decide whether or not to risk having
children with impairments rather than remaining chldless; 37
(8) recognition is not a necessary or logical extension of Roe v.
25. 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, -, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128, 129 (1981).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
28. Id. at -, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
29. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89.
30. Id. at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
31. Turpin, 119 Cal. App. 3d at -, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
32. Id. at -, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32.
33. Id. at-, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129-31.
34. Id. at-, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
35. Id. at -, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Wade;38 and, (9) the right of an impaired but living child to sue for
the injury of birth is better left to legislative determination.39
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The California Supreme Court recognized that Joy Turpin's
wrongful life claim was presented as a medical malpractice action
using generally applicable common law tort principles. 40 The
court noted the elements of a medical malpractice action in Cali-
fornia4' and determined that it was reasonably foreseeable that
the defendants' failure to discover Hope Turpin's hereditary ail-
ment would directly affect her parents and their potential off-
spring.42 Additionally, the court noted that the defendants had not
contended that they did not owe a duty of care either to Joy or to
her parents.43
Finding the plaintiffs injury to be legally cognizable, the court
rejected the appellate court's analysis by saying that it was inaccu-
rate to suggest that California's public policy established as a mat-
ter of law that under all circumstances impaired life is preferable
to nonlife.44 The court noted that in California all adult persons
have a fundamental right to control whether ordinary or extraordi-
nary means should be used to sustain their lives.45 Additionally,
the court found that while an unborn child in a wrongful life case
cannot make a decision as to the relative value of life versus death,
the law accords parents the right to protect the unconceived or un-
born child's interests.46 The court said:
Thus, when a defendant negligently fails to diagnose a hereditary ailment,
he harms the potential child as well as the parents by depriving the par-
ents of information which may be necessary to determine whether it is in
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Turpin, 119 Cal. App. 3d at -, 174 Cal. Rptr. at
133.
39. Id.
40. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 229, 643 P.2d at 959, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
41. Id. at 229, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
42. Id. at 230, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 233-35, 643 P.2d at 962-63, 182 CaL Rptr. at 345-46.
45. Id. at 233, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345. The court cited CAL. HEALTH
AND SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1982). Recognizing that other jurisdic-
tions have come to the same conclusion, the Turpin court cited to Matter of
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38-42, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (1976) (decision by patient to
permit a noncognitive, vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces
was a valuable incident of her constitutional right of privacy which could be
asserted on her behalf by her guardian) and Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 737-45, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423-27 (1977)
(guardian ad litem could decide that not treating a resident suffering with
myelblastic monocytic leukemia was in the best interest of the incompetent
resident).
46. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 233-34, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
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the child's own interest to be born with defects or not to be born at all.
47
The court, however, specifically rejected the Curlender analysis
as ignoring the essential nature of the defendant's alleged wrong
and obscuring the difference between an ordinary prenatal injury
and a wrongful life action by focusing on the plaintiff's condition
after birth to measure the defendants' liability.48 The court also
departed from Curlender by limiting a plaintiff-child's recovery to
special damages.4 9 The court concluded that a "reasoned, non-ar-
bitrary award of general damages is simply not obtainable"5 0 and
that monetary damages would not meaningfully compensate the
plaintiff for the loss of opportunity not to be born.5 1 The court de-
termined, however, that special damages, including the extraordi-
nary expenses for specialized teaching, training, and hearing
equipment required throughout the child's lifetime, are based on a
different footing and should be allowed.52 Special damages can be
readily ascertained and are commonly awarded in medical mal-
practice actions.5 3 Moreover, the extraordinary expenses are ex-
penses that would not have occurred but for the defendants'
negligence.54
V. ANALYSIS
In reaching its decision in Turpin, the California Supreme
Court decided the case essentially as a medical malpractice ac-
tion.55 Because the defendants demurred to the plaintiff's com-
plaint, the court's decision did not demand an extensive analysis of
each of the tort elements involved, but it is possible to infer from
the opinion much of what is not explicitly addressed regarding
duty, breach, causation, and damages. It is also possible to identify
a number of policy considerations at work in the wrongful life con-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 232-33, 643 P.2d at 960-61, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343-44.
49. Id. at 237-39, 643 P.2d at 965-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
50. Id. at 237, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 238, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 223-24, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339. The court enumerated the
basic elements of a professional malpractice action:
The elements of a cause of action in tort for professional negligence
are: (1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence and
diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and
exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection
between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) ac-
tual damage resulting from the professional's negligence.
Id. at 229-30, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (quoting Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal.
3d 195, 200, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1971)).
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text that influenced the court in reaching its decision.56 What fol-
lows is an explication of the Turpin court's resolution of the many
issues that were involved in developing its theory of a wrongful life
action.
A. Duty
To be held liable in a negligence action, the defendant must
owe the plaintiff a legal duty.57 "Whether a duty exists in a partic-
ular situation is essentially a legal conclusion, based on how far
the law is willing to extend liability."58 This determination rests
largely upon the plaintiff's ability to show that the injury sustained
was a foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct,59 and that, as
a matter of public policy, a duty should exist.60
Generally, it has been argued that courts should refuse to rec-
56. Numerous articles provided helpful background in writing this Note. Among
the most significant were: Capron, supra note 6; Capron, Informed Decision-
making In Genetic Counseling: A Dissent To The "Wrongful Life" Debate, 48
IND. L.J. 581 (1973); Cohen, Park v. Chessin. The Continuing Judicial Develop-
ment of the Theory of "Wrongful Life," 4 Am. J.L. & MED. 211 (1978); Kelley,
Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, And Justice In Tort Law, 4 WASH. U.L.Q. 919
(1979); Peters & Peters, Wrongful Life: Recognizing the Defective Child's
Right to a Cause of Action, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 857 (1980); Robertson, Toward
Rational Boundaries Of Tort Liability For Injury To The Unborn: Prenatal
Injuries, Preconception Injuries And Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE UJ. 1401; Rog-
ers, supra note 6; Stoutamire, The Effect Of Legalized Abortion On Wrongful
Life Actions, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 137 (1980); Tedeschi, On Tort Liability For
"Wrongful Life," 1 ISRAEL L REV. 513 (1966), reprinted in, 7 J. FAm. L. 465
(1967); Comment, "Wrongful Life". The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 2;
Note, Wrongful Life And A Fundamental Right To Be Born Healthy: Park v.
Chessin, Becker v. Schwartz, 27 BuFFALO L. REV. 537 (1978); Note, Wrongful
Life-Impaired Infant's Cause of Action Recognized: Curlender v. Bio-Sci-
ence Laboratories, supra note 9; Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life".
[A Suggested Analysis], 55 MaNN. L. REV. 58 (1970); Note, On Determining
Liability for "Wrongful Life": Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories-A Step
in the Right Direction?, supra note 2; Note, A Preference for Nonexistence:
Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of Genetic Malpractice, supra note 2;
Note, Torts-Wrongful Life-Infant's Right to Sue for Negligent Genetic Coun-
seling, supra note 2; Note, Torts-An Action For Wrongful Life Brought On
Behalf Of The Wrongfully Conceived Infant, 13 WAKE FOREST U REV. 712
(1977); Note, Torts: A Cause ofActionfor Wrongful Life, 20 WAsHBuRN L.J.
688 (1981); Note, A Reassessment of "Wrongful Life"And "Wrongful Birth"-
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979), 1980 Wis. L REV. 782; Note,
Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim Which Conforms To The Traditional Tort
Framework, 20 WM. & MARY I. REV. 125 (1978); Note, Father and Mother
Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic
Counseling, supra note 6.
57. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971).
58. Cohen, supra note 56, at 219.
59. Id.; Rogers, supra note 6, at 732.
60. Cohen, supra note 56, at 219; Rogers, supra note 6, at 732.
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ognize a duty on the part of a defendant-physician to a plaintiff-
child in a wrongful life action for any of three reasons: (1) public
policy favors defective existence over nonexistence in all situa-
tions;6 1 (2) no duty of care can be owed a person not in being at the
time of the alleged negligence;62 and (3) prior to conception, or af-
ter conception in utero, it would not have been actually possible
for the unborn plaintiff-child to have decided between life and non-
existence, so a child cannot be said to have been injured by any
failure to inform his or her parents of potential genetic defects.
63
While the Turpin court does not focus specifically on the duty is-
sue, it is clear that it rejects all of the above reasons for refusing to
recognize a duty on the part of a defendant-physician to a plaintiff-
child in a wrongful life action.
As previously noted, the Turpin court held that California pub-
lic policy does not establish as a matter of law that in all circum-
stances impaired life is preferable to nonlife.64 The court opined
that considering the short, painful life spans of many of the chil-
dren afflicted with genetic defects, it could not "assert with confi-
dence that in every situation there would be a societal consensus
that life is preferable to never having been born at all."65 Thus, the
court rejected the argument that public policy favors existence
over nonexistence in all situations.
66
Regarding the second reason for rejecting the cause of action,
the court explained that all the parties had agreed 67 that the fact
that the defendants' allegedly negligent act occurred prior to plain-
tiff's birth was of no moment, because California, like other juris-
dictions recently addressing the issue, had abandoned the
arbitrary limitation denying recovery for injuries inflicted prior to
birth.68 Additionally, the court recognized that no distinction
should be drawn between preconceptional and postconceptional
negligence.
69
61. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 429, 404 A.2d 8, 12-13 (1979); Park v.
Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 90-91, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 116 (1977) (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
62. Cohen, supra note 56, at 213; Robertson, supra note 56, at 1402-03; Note,
Torts-An Action For Wrongful Life Brought On Behalf Of The Wrongfully
Conceived Infant, supra note 56, at 714-16.
63. Comment, "Wrongful Life'" The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 2, at 489-90;
Note, A Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of
Genetic Malpractice, supra note 2, at 492.
64. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 233-34, 643 P.2d at 962-63, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46; see
supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
65. Id. at 234, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
66. Id. at 233-34, 643 P.2d at 962-63, 182 CaL Rptr. at 345-46.
67. Id. at 230, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
68. Id.; see Rogers, supra note 6, at 732.
69. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 230-31, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343. For an analy-
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Third, the court concluded that the fact that the child cannot
prior to conception or birth make a decision, as to whether or not
birth with defects is preferable to nonexistence, should not bar
recognition of the physician's duty.70 The court noted7 l that a
number of recent wrongful birth cases recognize that when a doc-
tor or other health care provider negligently fails to diagnose a he-
reditary defect, the parents are deprived of the opportunity to
make an informed decision as to whether to conceive and bear a
handicapped child.72 This information would be important to par-
ents because in deciding whether or not to bear a child, parents
take into account their own interests, as well as those of their po-
tential child73 Additionally, the court found74 that when a defend-
ant-physician negligently fails to diagnose an hereditary ailment,
he harms the potential child, as well as the parents, by depriving
the parents of information which may be necessary to determine
whether it is in the child's own best interest "to be born with de-
sis of the wrongful life cause of action distinguishing preconception and post-
conception cases, see Note, On Determining Liability for "Wrongful Life'"
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories-A Step in the Right Direction?, supra
note 2, at 222-31; see also Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of
Liabililty, 56 NEB. L REv. 706 (1977).
70. Several commentators have suggested an alternative approach to the duty
issue that could have been adopted by the Turpin court based upon a section
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See, e.g., Comment, "Wrongful Life'"
The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 2, at 490-91; Note, Wrongful Life: A
Modern Claim Which Conforms To The Traditional Tort Framework, supra
note 56, at 141-42. RESTATE ErNT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965) provides:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject
to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in
reasonable reliance upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in
peril by the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable
care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
Further, comment b to § 311 provides:
The rule stated in this section finds particular application where it
is a part of the actor's business or profession to give information
upon which the safety of the recipient or a third person depends.
Thus it is as much a part of the professional duty of a physician to
give correct information as to the character of the disease from which
his patient is suffering, where such knowledge is necessary to the
safety of the patient or others, as it is to make a correct diagnosis or
to prescribe the appropriate medicine.
71. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 233, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
72. See supra note 1.
73. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 233-34, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
74. Id.
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fects or not to be born at all." 75 Finally the court said:
We do not.., deny recovery to an infant who is injured when a doctor
negligently fails to provide treatment chosen by the infant's parents even
though we cannot determine whether the infant would have agreed with
the parents' choice of treatment. Similarly, it appears anomalous to deny
recovery simply because it was not possible for the "child-to-be" to make a
choice. In the preconception or fetal stage, as in childhood, it is parents
who nearly always make medical choices to protect their children's
interests.
7 6
The court said that the defendants had not alleged that they
owed no duty of care either to Joy or to her parents,77 and "it was
reasonably foreseeable that Hope's parents and their potential off-
spring would be directly affected by defendants' negligent failure
to discover that Hope suffered from a hereditary ailment .... "78
The theory that the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty was there-
fore adopted by the court based upon the foreseeability of the
harm and consideration of public policy.
B. Breach
Whether or not the defendants breached their duty to the plain-
tiff-child in a wrongful birth action is generally a question of fact
for the jury.79 Because the defendants in Turpin demurred to the
plaintiff's complaint, the court did not thoroughly analyze the ele-
ment of breach.
One commentator indicates that in a negligence action for
wrongful life, actual misfeasance on the part of the defendant must
exist for a breach of duty to occur;80 the defendant must have been
affirmatively negligent. Another commentator, however, suggests
that it should make no difference whether the defendant-physi-
cian's negligence is based upon an act (misfeasance) or omission
(nonfeasance):81
[W] hat appears to be an omission actually may be affirmative misconduct.
If a physician fails to administer a prenatal test to determine congenital
defects that is mandated by standard professional conduct, he is not fail-
ing merely to act to protect the mother and the potential child, but actively
is practicing medicine carelessly and harming his patients.
8 2
75. Id.; see Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (a
patient has a right to information material to making intelligent decisions as
to treatment of disease); see also Capron, supra note 56, at 597-98.
76. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 234 n.9, 643 P.2d at 962 n.9, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345 n.9.
77. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 230, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
78. Id.
79. Peters & Peters, supra note 56, at 864.
80. Cohen, supra note 56, at 217.
81. Note, Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim Which Conforms To The Traditional
Tort Framework, supra note 56, at 147-48.
82. Id. at 148 (footnote omitted).
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It is manifest in the Turpin opinion that the court recognized
that a breach of duty resulting in harm to the plaintiff did in fact
occur when the defendants misdiagnosed Hope's condition and
transmitted the erroneous information to the family's pedi-
trician.83 Through this conduct which directly affected the plain-
tiff, defendants clearly did not exercise the degree of skill,
knowledge, and care ordinarily exercised by other members of
their profession under similar circumstances. 84 The future child
had a right to have her parents informed of the probability that any
child they might conceive would suffer from hereditary deafness,
so that they might determine on her behalf whether birth with de-
fects was preferable to nonexistence.8 5 In this case, the ultimate
harm resulting from the breach of duty was that Joy Turpin was
"born with an hereditary ailment rather than not being born at
a]1.1986
C. Causation
According to Prosser, "Causation is a fact. It is a matter of what
has in fact occurred. A cause is a necessary antecedent: in a very
real and practical sense, the term embraces all things which so far
contributed to the result that without them it would not have oc-
curred."8 7 In order to fix liability upon the defendant in any negli-
gence action, the plaintiff must meet the burden of proving both
cause in fact and legal or proximate cause.8 8 Conduct is a cause in
fact if the injury resulting from the conduct would not have re-
sulted but for the act in question 89 or "if it was a material element
and a substantial factor in bringing it about."90 Unless reasonable
men could not differ, determination of materiality and substantial-
ity is ordinarily made by the jury.91 Legal or proximate cause is
"[a] reasonable close causal connection between the conduct and
the resulting injury."92 Substantive conceptions about the scope of
liability and defenses distinguish cause in fact from legal or proxi-
83. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
84. Brown v. Cohn, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 522 P.2d 688, 114 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1974). The
California standard is not, however, to be strictly interpreted as a locality
rule. Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949). The trend is toward
replacement of the locality rule with a national standard. See, e.g., Wentling
v. Jenny, 206 Neb. 335, 293 N.W.2d 76 (1980). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 299A (1965); Annot., 37 AJ.R.3d 420 (1971).
85. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
86. Id. at 232, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
87. W. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 41, at 237.
88. Id., § 30, at 143, § 38, at 208-09, § 41, at 241.
89. Id., § 41, at 238-39.
90. Id., § 41, at 240.
91. Id., § 45, at 289.
92. Id., § 30, at 143.
19831
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
mate cause. For instance, the doctrine of foreseeability is a signifi-
cant factor in determining when the necessary degree of proximity
is present to elevate a cause in fact to proximate cause. 93
According to one commentator, "If one accepts the idea that the
damage the child is suing for [in a wrongful life action] is not its
deformity, but rather its birth... proximate cause presents little
obstacle to the child's recovery."94 From this perspective, the de-
fendants in Turpin cannot be said to have caused, in fact, the de-
fect from which the plaintiff presently suffers. Indeed, it is clear in
Turpin that the court found that the defendants could have done
nothing to have provided the plaintiff with an opportunity "'to be
born as a whole, functional human being without total deaf-
ness."' 95 Nevertheless, one commentator would argue that be-
cause the defendants' conduct occurred prior to conception rather
than after, the defect would not have resulted but for their negli-
gent conduct and that the conduct should also be determined to be
the legal or proximate cause.9 6 Still, the real injury in Turpin is
not Joy's hereditary deafness, but, rather, it is her having been
born with hereditary deafness instead of not being born.97 It was
averred in the complaint that if the defendants had not failed to
inform her parents of Hope's genetic defect that Joy would never
have been conceived.98 Thus, by not informing her parents of
Hope's hereditary deafness, and, thereby, preventing Joy's concep-
tion, the defendants' conduct was both the cause in fact and the
legal and proximate cause of her injury.
D. Damages
In dealing with the element of damages, the Turpin court noted
that other courts have refused to allow a child's claim for pain and
93. Note, Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim Which Conforms To The Traditional
Tort Framework, supra note 56, at 144.
94. Comment, "Wrongful Life". The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 2, at 491.
95. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 231, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
96. Note, On Determining Liability for "Wrongful Life" Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories-A Step in the Right Direction?, supra note 2, at 223-24; Note,
Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of Liability, supra note 69, at 712-17.
97. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
98. Id. at 224, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
In Turpin, the defendants demurred to Joy's averment as to what her par-
ents would have done had they known of Hope's hereditary deafness. In fu-
ture cases the truth of such an averment may be subject to the scrutiny of the
jury as a part of the determination of cause in fact and proximate cause.
There is some discussion by commentators as to whether a subjective or ob-
jective test should be applied. E.g., Comment, "Wrongful Life" The Right
Not To Be Born, supra note 2, at 491-92; Note, Father and Mother Know Best
Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling,
supra note 6, at 1509-10.
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suffering on the grounds that it is not possible in any rational way
to determine whether the plaintiff in a wrongful life action has in
fact suffered an injury by being born.99 A wrongful life case
presents the question of the value of impaired existence versus
nonexistence. 00 Because of the compensatory nature of damages
in tort,'0 ' "the jury generally compares the condition plaintiff
would have been in but for the tort, with the position the plaintiff is
in now, compensating the plaintiff for what has been lost as a re-
sult of the wrong."102 The court concluded that in a wrongful life
context a rational nonspeculative determination of a specific mon-
etary award for general damages, including compensation for pain
and suffering, appeared "to be outside the realm of human compe-
tence."' 03 The court emphasized that jury members would have no
frame of reference from which to measure such damages' 0 4 and
asserted that the tort benefit doctrine'05 would have to be applied
by the jurors to balance any benefits resulting from the defend-
ants' conduct against the detriments.10
Similarly, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that gen-
eral damages are routinely awarded in medical malpractice cases
for pain and suffering and mental distress and that juries are
equally as competent to assess appropriate damages in wrongful
life cases. 0 7 In addition, the court refused to accept the plaintiff's
argument that the difficulty of ascertaining damages should not to-
tally prevent any recovery of general damages. 08
Citing two recent decisions, Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. 109
and Baxter v. Superior Court,"o the court concluded that general
damages would not "in any meaningful sense compensate the
plaintiff for the loss of the opportunity not to be born ...
99. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 234-35, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
100. Id. at 236, 643 P.2d at 963-64, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47.
101. Id. at 236, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1965). This section provides:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plain-
tiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit
to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the bene-
fit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent
that this is equitable.
106. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 236-37, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
107. Id. at 235, 643 P.2d at 643, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
108. Id.
109. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977) (child has no nonstatutory
cause of action in negligence for loss of parental consortium).
110. 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977) (parent has no cause of
action for loss of filial consortium).
111. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 237, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
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Moreover, according to the court the damage assessment in both of
those cases was less problematic than in Turpin.112
While the court rejected any recovery of general damages, it
viewed Joy Turpin's claim for special damages, the extraordinary
expenses for specialized teaching, training, and hearing equip-
ment, to be on different footing." 3 The court held that the ex-
traordinary expenses clearly would not have occurred but for the
defendants' negligence and that they are the kind of pecuniary
losses that are readily ascertainable and commonly awarded in
medical malpractice actions." 4 Additionally, the court noted that
an award of these special damages in a wrongful life action may
not only be necessary for the well-being of the child, but in some
instances it may be vital to his or her survival." 5
To further substantiate its position, the court said that an award
to cover extraordinary expenses is consistent with the tort benefit
doctrine in that the plaintiff-child receives no benefit to offset the
pecuniary interests that are harmed." 6 The court noted that while
such damages may not "remove the heartache or undo the harm"
they can relieve financial burdens." 7 The court also asserted that
awarding special damages would act as a deterrent to further neg-
ligent acts by the defendants and others assuming similar
duties." 8
Finally, the court reasoned that a child's receipt of necessary
medical expenses should not be dependent on the availability of
parents who can sue and recover, nor should they be limited to the
time when parents remain legally responsible for providing such
care.119 The court held that where a defendant's breach of duty is
the proximate cause of such expenses, the defendant should be
held liable for the cost of care borne by the parents and the
child.120
While the court's award of special damages undoubtedly will
help the wrongful life plaintiff, and the reasons that are cited for
doing so seem sound, the refusal to allow general damages cannot
112. Id. While the court considers damages for the loss of parental or filial consor-
tium to be too intangible in character to measure, it clearly holds that the
damages for the loss of the opportunity not to be born are even more intangi-
ble in character and therefore more difficult to assess.
113. Id. at 237, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
114. Id. at 238, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
115. Id.; see also Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 68-69, 432 A.2d 834, 841 (1981).
116. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 239, 643 P.2d at 965-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
117. Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348 (quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
49 N.J. 22, 49, 227 A.2d 689, 703 (1967) (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
118. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 239 n.15, 643 P.2d at 966 n.15, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349 n.15.
119. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 238, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
120. Id.
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be viewed with the same approval. Justice Mosk stated in his
dissent:
An order is internally inconsistent which permits a child to recover special
damages for a so-called wrongful life action, but denies all general dam-
ages for the very same tort. While the modest compassion of the majority
may be commendable, they suggest no principle of law that justifies so
neatly circumscribing the nature of damages suffered of a defendant's
negligence.
1 2 1
Indeed, the court's reasons for denying general damages are not
convincing. It is a settled principle of tort law in California that the
plaintiff is to be awarded any damages that naturally flow and
proximately result from the defendant's breach of duty. 2 2 Can it
honestly be said that the plaintiff's pain and suffering is less proxi-
mately a result of the defendants' negligence than the plaintiff's
extraordinary expenses? Both are suffered by the plaintiff as a re-
sult of the basic injury of being born with a defect rather than not
being born at all. 123 It is clear that the plaintiff's position has been
changed by the defendants' tort. 24 The fact that nonpecuniary
damages are less certain than pecuniary damages should not bar
121. Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
122. CA. Crvm CODE § 3333 (West 1970) provides: "For the breach of an obligation
not arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise
expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate for all
the detriment, proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been antic-
ipated or not." See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 426 P.2d 173,
178, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (1967), where the court said: "Fundamental in our
jurisprudence is the principle that for every wrong there is a remedy and that
an injured party should be compensated for all damage proximately caused
by the wrongdoer."
123. As the Curlender court said: 'The reality of the 'wrongful-life' concept is that
such a plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others."
Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (emphasis in origi-
nal). One commentator has written: "If the physicians' negligence has
caused the birth of a tortured child that the mother, speaking on her own
behalf and on behalf of her child, would have sought to avoid, then he has also
caused the child's pain and suffering that inevitably coincides with that
birth." Note, Wrongful Birtkh Judicial Reticence with an Emerging Tort: The
Negligent Performance of Genetic Counseling-Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,
404 A.2d 8 (1979), 6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 115, 130 (1981) (emphasis added).
124. Plaintiff's position has been changed from a state of nonexistence without
pain and suffering before the negligence to a state of existence with pain and
suffering after the negligence. Comment, "Wrongful Life'". The Right Not To
Be Born, supra note 2, at 496; Note, Wrongful Life And A Fundamental Right
To Be Born Healthy: Park v. Chessin, Becker v. Schwartz, supra note 56, at
555-56.
While the primary purpose for awarding damages is compensation, a
plaintiff's damage award seldom, if ever, returns a plaintiff to the exact status
which existed prior to an injury. 'The damage award is substitutionary relief,
that is, it gives the plaintiff money mainly by way of compensation, to make
up for some loss that was not originally, a money loss, but one that ordinarily
may be measured in money." D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES
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recovery of the nonpecuniary damages.125 As the plaintiff argued,
such damages are routinely recoverable in other medical malprac-
tice actions.
12 6
The Turpin majority sees "the threshold question of determin-
ing whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury by being
born with an ailment as opposed to not being born at all" as being
the problem.127 The majority says that a jury has no frame of refer-
§ 3.1, at 135 (1973). In the wrongful life context, one commentator has
suggested.
The individual who seeks wrongful life recovery is not looking for
court approval to allow him to die so that he may return to nonexis-
tence. Instead, such person should be awarded damages to the ex-
tent of compensating him for the fact that he may not be returned to
the pre-tort state.
Note, Liability for Wrongfully Causing One To Be Born: Development of a
Tort for "Wrongful Life," 10 U. WEST LA. L REv. 53, 61 (1978) (footnote omit-
ted). But another commentator favors the substitutionary approach adopted
by the Curlender court-
IT]he Curlender court saw the injury, in this instance, as birth with a
defect, which resulted in the painful existence of the plaintiff. The
purpose of the damage award as defined by Curlender, is to compen-
sate for the wrongful pain and suffering causes by the defendant's
negligence. It is thus unnecessary to focus on a determination of the
value of life and nonlife.
A traditional tort negligence concept-the award of damages on
the basis of pain and suffering-should be applied in place of the
wrongful life concept upon proper proof of the child's actual pain and
suffering. By measuring damages in terms of the wrongful pain and
suffering of the child, a look into the metaphysical calculations as to
the value of life and nonlife is avoided.
Note, On Determining Liability for "Wrongful Life": Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories-A Step in the Right Direction?, supra note 2, at 222 (emphasis
in original).
125. "The requirement of certainty has relatively little application to nonpecu-
niary items of personal injury, such as pain and suffering." S. ScHREBER,
DAmAGES: IN PERSONAL INUtmY AND WRONGFuL DEATH CASES 25 (1965). The
United States Supreme Court has held: "The rule which precludes the recov-
ery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain result of the
wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong
and only uncertain in respect to their amount." Story Parchment Co. v. Pat-
erson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931). See also City of Kennett
v. Katz Constr. Co., 273 Mo. 279, 202 S.W. 558 (1918).
126. E.g., Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 500 P.2d 880, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 856 (1972) (trial court must instruct jury on the infant plaintiff's pain
and suffering even though the infant could not testify on her own behalf).
127. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. Here, by re-
turning to the metaphysical issue of nonexistence versus existence in regard
to the computation of pain and suffering damages, the court appears to be
backing away from its earlier conclusion that the defendants' negligence had
resulted in a cognizable injury to the plaintiff. The real problem for the court,
however, is assessing the value of the general damages. If the real problem
was whether the plaintiff had in fact suffered injury, the court would have
had no basis upon which to approve the award of special damages which it
f[Vol. 62:175
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ence from which to deal with that question. 28 While that may be
true, jurors are generally not instructed to determine damages for
pain and suffering by basing the amount awarded upon how much
money they, as individual jurors, would be willing to accept for ex-
periencing the same quantity of pain and suffering.129 In recent
products liability cases involving diethystilboestrol (DES), the
courts are in fact determining damages based on a comparison of
the value of life with pain and suffering and nonexistence.130 What
determined were the proximate result of the defendants' negligence. The
plaintiff's pain and suffering, as much as the expenses necessary to treat the
hereditary ailment, stem from the defects suffered by the child. Perhaps as
one commentator says:
Although compensatory damages may be difficult to ascertain in
wrongful life cases, if they are shown to exist, recovery should not be
denied totally. A practical approach, both in terms of measurement
and limitation, is to award traditional tort damages stemming solely
from the defects suffered by the child rather than balancing exist-
ence with nonexistence.
Note, Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim Which Conforms To The Traditional
Tort Framework, supra note 56, at 155. Another commentator says that non-
existence has no value and, therefore, the determination of damages in a
wrongful life case should be based upon a weighing of the benefits and bur-
dens of the plaintiff's existence. Note, A Cause of Action For "Wrongful Life'"
[A Suggested Analysis], supra note 56, at 62-67. A combination of the ap-
proaches of these two commentators would appear to provide a reasonable
basis for the determination of general damages.
128. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 236, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347. One commenta-
tor suggests that the lack of frame of reference on the part of jurors does not
present a particularly unique problem:
[J]urors can never actually experience a plaintiff's life in its "nor-
mal" state before an injury or in the injured state that resulted from
a defendant's actions. An imaginative leap is always required; the
more severe the injury the greater the leap. There will, for example,
always be an element of empathetic speculation in a jury's assess-
ment of what it means for a person to be irreversibly blind, deaf, or
comatose, or of the harm in losing the enjoyment of life's activities
when one departs "this vale of tears" for the "great hereafter." So,
too, a thoughtful assessment of damages requires an imaginative
leap in the case of a child with congenital defects in order to account
for the condition the child would have been in had the defendant ac-
ted properly. There may be some situations in which common un-
derstanding would lead to the conclusion that it would be better to be
dead (or never to have existed)-and it is for the finder of fact to
determine just how much better it would be.
Capron, supra note 6, at 658-59 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
129. D. DOBBS, supra note 124, § 8.1, at 545: "Not only can pain not be measured by
a market, it is not to be measured by the 'Golden Rule' either-that is, the
jury is not to be told to award an amount they would personally take to un-
dergo the plaintiffs injuries." See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 912 comment b (1965).
130. In recent products liability cases involving diethystilboestrol (DES), the
courts are in fact determining damages based upon a comparison of the value
of life with pain and suffering and the value of nonexistence. Phillips v.
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makes the identical determination so difficult in the wrongful life
context?
Application of the tort benefit doctrine would be appropriate in
the determination of general damages. As one commentator says:
Under this balancing analysis, a jury would consider the severity of the
child's defect. Where the child's deformity was slight, the jury might find
that the burden of living with the defect is offset by the benefits of life, and
deny the child recovery. Where the deformity was severe, however, the
jury might find that this burden outweighed any benefits, and award the
child compensation. The amount of award would reflect the difference be-
tween the burden of life with defects and the benefits of life. The more
severe the handicap, the less beneficial the child's existence, and the
greater the award.1 3 1
While this explanation is directed to damages as a whole, the Tur-
pin court has adopted a sound position in refusing to balance non-
pecuniary benefits against pecuniary injuries. 3 2 There is no
reason why the benefit doctrine would have to be applied to both
general and special damages.133 When instructing the jury regard-
ing general damages, the court can simply require the jury to bal-
ance the benefits against the detriments and inform them that the
net could amount to zero.134 Such a determination might well be
partly intuitive, but juries are frequently called upon to make intu-
itive, "black box" decisions.135 A separate instruction would of
course be given concerning special damages.
Recognition of general damages would allow the plaintiff to be
fully compensated for his or her lost opportunity not to be born.
An award of general damages could ease some of the plaintiff's dis-
comfort and help pay the plaintiff's attorney fees for which he or
United States (Phillips I), 508 F. Supp. 537, 543-44 n.12 (D.S.C. 1980), see also
Rogers, supra note 6, at 736-37.
131. Comment, "Wrongful Life" The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 2, at 498.
132. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 237-39, 643 P.2d at 965-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
133. D. DOBBS, supra note 124, § 1.2, at 7 (The damages can be varied according to
what is appropriate in the situation.).
134. This has been suggested in the wrongful birth context and it should apply
equally as well in wrongful life cases. Robertson, supra note 56, at 1448.
135. Wrongful life claims should be treated as questions of fact for the jury. See
supra text accompanying note 79. "A determination of the validity of a plain-
tiff's wrongful life claim, as well as an assessment of appropriate damages for
the injury, is more appropriately left to the 'black box' decisionmaking of a
jury rather than being precluded as a matter of law." Note, A Reassessment of
"Wrongful Life" and "Wrongful Birth"-Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d
8 (1979), supra note 56, at 791. For a discussion of the "black box" function of
a jury, see Higgenbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allo-
cation of Judicial Power, 56 TEx. L. REV. 47, 56 (1977). Higgenbotham writes:
"By the term 'black box decisions' I mean the difficult decisions that remain
arbitrary in the sense that they can only be based on the specific equities of
each individual case and cannot convincingly be explained on wholly logical
grounds."
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she is otherwise uncompensated.13 6 It is not appropriate for the
court to force the plaintiff into a position where he or she must give
up essential medical care, upon which his or her very life may de-
pend, in order to pay an attorney. Finally, recognition of general
damages should act as a further deterrent 37 to negligent conduct
on the part of physicians and other health care providers engaged
in the kind of activities which could result in denial of a child's
limited right not to be born.
E. Policy
One commentator, Rogers, has explained the reluctance of
many courts to recognize a wrongful life action as a manifestation
of residual opposition to abortion.138 This, he says, is evident in
the willingness of the same courts to recognize causes of action
brought by plaintiffs in the ordinary prenatal tort context.139 Rog-
ers suggests that this kind of arbitrary line drawing is clearly ex-
emplified by the DES cases.140 In these cases, he says, DES was
prescribed to the mothers during pregnancy to prevent the sponta-
neous abortion (miscarriage) of fetuses; and while the drug pre-
vented the spontaneous abortion, it also caused the plaintiffs to be
born with defects.141 In the wrongful life cases like Turpin the neg-
ligent conduct, at least in part, is that the doctors had failed to
timely inform the parents that their offspring may be born geneti-
cally defective. Timely notice under these circumstances would al-
low the parents in the best interest of their offspring to choose not
to conceive or, in the case where conception has already occurred,
to request a eugenic abortion (performed to prevent the birth of
genetically defective offspring). Rogers notes that in the DES
cases, just as in the wrongful life actions, the alternative to being
born with defects is nonexistence, and yet the courts have raised
none of the objections to damages that they have raised in the
wrongful life actions.142
This kind of underlying prolife sentiment may at least partially
explain the reluctance of the Turpin court to award general dam-
ages. A commentator who noted this influence in earlier wrongful
136. Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 511, 364 P.2d 337, 345, 15
Cal. Rptr. 161, 169 (1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting); D. Doins, supra note 124,
§ 8.2, at 550-51.
137. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 239 n.15, 643 P.2d at 966 n.15, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349 n.15
(damages for extraordinary expenses are viewed as a deterrent of future
negligence).
138. Rogers, supra note 6, at 754.
139. Id. at 753-54.
140. Id. at 754-55.
141. Id. at 736-37, 754-55.
142. Id. at 754-55.
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life cases wrote: "[T] he primary and perhaps only distinction be-
tween wrongful life claims and other pre-natal torts is the unavail-
ability of in utero treatment in the circumstances of the former.
the only alternatives are defective birth or eugenic abortion."' 43 It
is interesting that the Turpin court explicitly states that in a case
where negligent genetic counseling or prenatal testing resulted in
a failure to diagnose a defect that could be treated in utero, the
plaintiff-child would have a prenatal tort claim.144 Under these cir-
cumstances, a plaintiff would be entitled to a full range of damages
flowing from the physician's negligence.145
The Turpin court has taken a step, however, that no other high
court, thus far, has been willing to take. It has developed a theory
which recognizes a wrongful life cause of action. This
counterbalances the traditional prolife policies and establishes a
child's limited right not to be born with a defect.14 6 This right is
grounded upon public policy which does not, in all situations, sup-
port the concept that life with defects is superior to nonlife and
upon the fact that parents generally make medical choices to pro-
tect their children's interests both before and after birth.147 Thus,
as held in Curlender, a physician has a duty to inform parents ef-
fectively, so that they have the information necessary to decide
whether to conceive or bear a child when there is a predictable risk
of congenital defects.148
The Turpin opinion indicates concern about the necessity of de-
terring the negligent conduct of physicians and other health care
providers that would prevent parents from determining whether it
is in a child's interest to be born with defects or not to be born at
all.149 The opinion, however, does not emphasize the need to deter
such negligence in order to lower public and private expenditures
required for the care of persons who are genetically impaired.SO
143. Id. at 756.
144. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 231 n.8, 643 P.2d at 961 n.8, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344 n.8.
145. Id. at 230-31, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343. The Turpin court said that
had Joy's deafness been caused by the negligent treatment of her mother
during pregnancy or prior to conception, Joy would have been entitled to re-
cover general damages against the negligent party. Id. See Capeluto v. Kai-
ser Found. Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 500 P.2d 880, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1972) (infant
entitled to instruction on damages for pain and suffering in medical malprac-
tice action); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967)
(range of damages stemming from a physician's negligence).
146. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 233-34, 643 P.2d at 962-63, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 239 n.15, 643 P.2d at 966 n.15, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349 n.15.
150. See Note, A Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort
of Genetic Malpractice, supra note 2, at 506. Care of persons with genetic
disease provided through public and private expenditures costs over two bil-
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One commentator has suggested that these costs could be reduced
significantly by recognizing the wrongful life tort.151 This view is
supported by the theory of tort law that assigns the cost of harm to
the "cheapest cost avoiders." 5 2 If this policy had been adopted by
the Turpin court the reluctance to allow general damages may
have vanished.
Some courts' 53 and commentators154 have expressed concern
that recognition of the wrongful life cause of action might en-
courage children to bring suits against their parents based on that
theory. This presented no problem for the Turpin court because of
the recent enactment of section 43.6 of the California Civil Code
which prohibits any action "against a parent of a child based upon
the claim that the child should not have been conceived, or, if con-
ceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive."1
55
Even without such a statute, however, it is unlikely that a cause of
action against a parent for wrongful life would be recognized be-
cause of the fundamental nature of parental rights to make deci-
sions concerning procreation. 56 As a practical matter most
wrongful life suits are brought by parents on behalf of their chil-
dren, and therefore it is not likely that many actions would be
lion dollars annually and runs thirty-two times the cost of prenatal screening
and elective abortion. See also Shaw, supra note 6.
151. Note, A Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of
Genetic Malpractice, supra note 2, at 505-506.
152. See generally, G. CALEBRESI, THE COST OF AcCMENTS 130-40 (1970).
153. See e.g., Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 94-95, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 118 (1977)
(Titone, J., dissenting). The possibility of such suits is also discussed in
Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
154. See e.g., Cohen, supra note 56, at 230-31; Note, A Preference for Nonexistence:
Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of Genetic Malpractice, supra note 2, at
502-504; Note, Wrongful Life-Impaired Infant's Cause of Action Recognized:
Curlender v. Rio-Science Laboratories, supra note 9, at 682; Note, Torts-
Wrongful Life-No Cause Of Action For Failure To Inform Parents Of Possi-
ble Birth Defects, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 750, 754-55 (1967).
155. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982) provides:
(a) No cause of action arises against a parent of a child based
upon the claim that the child should not have been conceived or, if
conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive.
(b) The failure or refusal of a parent to prevent the live birth of
his or her child shall not be a defense in any action against a third
party, nor shall the failure or refusal be considered in awarding dam-
ages in any such action.
(c) As used in this section "conceived" means the fertilization of
a human ovum by a human sperm.
156. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
These cases can be read to indicate that parents possess procreational rights
protecting them against wrongful life actions brought against them by their
children. See also Note, A Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a
Proposed Tort of Genetic Malpractice, supra note 2, at 504 n.161.
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filed.157 Even if suits were brought by guardians ad litem, it is not
likely that they could prevail because of the parental procreative
rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
Turpin v. Sortini marks a significant achievement in the effort
to overcome the obstacles to recognition of a wrongful life action
grounded in medical malpractice. The California Supreme Court
has determined that in some instances life with pain and suffering
is less desirable than not having been born at all, and that public
policy does not support the rejection of a wrongful life action as a
matter of law. The court determined that a doctor or other health
care provider owes a preconceptional and postconceptional duty to
a child to inform his or her parents of any likelihood of a genetic
defect, so that the parents might make an informed decision on
behalf of the child prior to birth as to whether life with defects is
preferable to nonexistence.
The Turpin court does not skirt the issue, but clearly acknowl-
edges that the alleged injury to the child is being born with defects
and the lost opportunity not to be born. For the most part, the
court is successful at fitting the cause of action into the traditional
tort framework. The weakest link in a generally well-reasoned
opinion is the refusal to allow a recovery of general damages
which, as Justice Mosk noted in his dissent, is inconsistent with
the determination that special damages should be awarded. The
court should reconsider this aspect of its decision and allow jurors
to make a determination in each individual case whether and to
what extent general damages should be awarded.
Overall, the decision in Turpin is a step forward toward assur-
ing that injured children will be compensated and that physicians
and others who are engaged in genetic counseling and prenatal
testing (or in any other area of medical practice that could have a
bearing on whether a child will be conceived or born) will more
carefully undertake their responsibilities. While recognition of
wrongful life actions based on medical malpractice will undoubt-
edly increase medical costs, the costs may be offset to some extent
through the prevention of suffering and through savings realized
by both individuals and society due to the decreased need to care
for genetically defective children and adults. Whether or not
courts in other jurisdictions will follow the California Supreme
157. Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life" [A Suggested Analysis], supra
note 56, at 75. One commentator has noted, however, that this observation
fails to consider the fact that a guardian ad litem might be chosen to repre-
sent the child's interest against a parent. Cohen, supra note 56, at 231 n.140.
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Court in adopting this kind of wrongful life decision remains to be
seen, but a relatively well-reasoned model to follow now exists for
those courts inclined to do so.
David G. Dales '83

